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Svato-Mykhaylivska Parafiya v. Ukraine:                    
A Thing Done by Halves? 
Gennadiy Druzenko∗
About two years have passed since the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) decided Svato-Mykhaylivska Parafiya v. 
Ukraine,
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
1 a case in which the Court held that Ukraine violated2 
Article 9 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms.3 At first glance, this case belongs to the line 
of ECtHR’s case law which includes cases such as: Metropolitan 
Church of Bessarabia and Others v. Moldova,4 
 
 ∗ LLB (International Science and Technology University, Kyiv, Ukraine), LLM (Kyiv 
National Taras Shevchenko University, Ukraine), LLM in European Law (University of 
Aberdeen, Scotland, UK). An earlier edition of this paper was delivered to the Noodt 
Consultation on the Strasbourg Conference Project, Geneva, Switzerland, June 22, 2008. 
 1. Application no. 77703/01 (2007), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ 
(follow “Case-Law” hyperlink; then follow “HUDOC” hyperlink; then search application 
number “77703/01”). 
 2. It was the second case Ukraine lost in the European Court of Human Rights under 
Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The first case was Poltoratskiy v. 
Ukraine, 39 Eur. Ct. H.R. 43 (2004). 
 3. Article 9 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms guarantees the freedom of religion and provides that: 
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right 
includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in 
community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in 
worship, teaching, practice and observance. 
2. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such 
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the 
interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for 
the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 9, Sept. 
1953, CETS 5, available at http://conventions.coe.int/ (follow “Treaties” hyperlink; follow 
“Complete list” hyperlink; follow “Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms” hyperlink). Today, forty-seven European countries including Russia, 
Turkey, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, but excluding Belarus, are signatories of the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, also known as 
European Convention on Human Rights. 
 4. 35 Eur. Ct. H.R. 13 (2002). 
Moscow Branch of the 
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Salvation Army v. Russia,5 and Church of Scientology Moscow v. 
Russia.6
However, Svato-Mykhaylivska Parafiya v. Ukraine also belongs 
to another line of case law that started with Serif v. Greece,
 In all these cases, typical of former Soviet Republics, the 
state refused to register the “wrong” (from its point of view) 
religious organization and, thus, prevented the religious organization 
from obtaining status as a legal entity. 
7 and 
continued in Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria8 and partly in 
Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and Others v. Moldova.9 All cases 
of this type deal with divided religious communities in circumstances 
where the state attempts to determine which part of the divided 
community is the proper assignee of the undivided predecessor. The 
peculiarity of this line of cases is that, in making this determination, 
the state does not examine or judge religious doctrine and does not 
doubt the religious doctrine’s legitimacy. Instead, the state tries to 
prevent the religious community from dividing, thereby forcing 
separated groups to reunite—or at least to identify the proper legal 
successor of the formerly undivided organization. 
In addition to these shared characteristics, Svato-Mykhaylivska 
Parafiya has its own unique features. Below I argue that even 
though this case undoubtedly dealt with freedom of religion, it was 
essentially a corporate and property dispute. To substantiate this 
view, I start with a brief explanation of the historical and factual 
background against which events described in the judgment 
happened, mentioning in passing
 
 5. 44 Eur. Ct. H.R. 46 (2007).  
 6. 46 Eur. Ct. H.R. 16 (2008). 
 7. 31 Eur. Ct. H.R. 20 (2001). 
 8. 34 Eur. Ct. H.R. 55 (2002). 
 9. 35 Eur. Ct. H.R. 13 (2002). 
 some factual lapses by the Court. I 
then briefly outline Ukrainian legislation in the field of religious 
freedom to demonstrate the general correctness of the Court’s 
critique of this legislation. Next, I critique the Court’s abstention 
from considering the argument between rival groups of believers as a 
property and corporate dispute. Finally, I present the domestic 
reaction to the ECtHR’s judgment. 
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II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE UKRAINIAN ORTHODOX 
CHURCH 
From its foundation in the tenth to the end of the twelfth 
century, and from the midst of the fifteenth to the end of the 
seventeenth century, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church was 
independent from the Russian, or more precisely, the Moscow 
Church10
It should thus be born in mind that the Svato-Mykhaylivska 
Parish, established in 1989, began when great changes in the 
structure of the Orthodox Church in Ukraine were taking place. 
Thousands of orthodox parishes unexpectedly faced the dilemma of 
choosing which Church to affiliate with when their religious leaders, 
who had just publicly mauled each other, suddenly amalgamated 
into new churches. The critical lack of temples surviving after the 
Soviet fight against religion, in conjunction with the jump in the 
 and was a Metropolis (Archdiocese) of the Ecumenical 
Patriarchate of Constantinople. As Ukrainian territories gradually 
joined the Moscow Kingdom in the second part of the seventeenth 
century, however, the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople was 
forced to abdicate jurisdiction over the Kyiv Metropolis to his 
Moscow counterpart. In the early twentieth century, during the 
short time of Ukrainian independence, the Ukrainian self-governing 
(so-called Autocephalous) Orthodox Church was established. The 
Ukrainian Orthodox Church was later annihilated by Soviet power in 
the 1930s, revived during German occupation in the 1940s, and 
officially revived again in 1989 on the eve of the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. Thus, in the early 1990s there were two Orthodox 
Churches in Ukraine: the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Moscow 
Patriarchate (UOC MP) and the Ukrainian Autocephalous 
Orthodox Church (UAOC). In March of 1992, the leader of the 
UOC MP, Metropolitan Filaret, was forced by the Archbishop 
Council of the Moscow Patriarchate to retire from his position. He 
refused, however, to resign himself to the Council decision and took 
part of the UOC MP and united with part of the UAOC to establish 
the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Kyiv Patriarchate (UOC KP). 
 
 10. From establishment of the ancient state of Kyivan Rus in the tenth century (and 
even earlier) to the middle of the seventeenth century, “Rus” and its derivatives were 
associated with the territory of modern Ukraine, or at least parts of Ukraine, and only in the 
second half of the seventeenth century was this name, together with Ukrainian lands, gradually 
appropriated by the Moscow Kingdom. Such transition of the Moscow Kingdom into the 
Russian Empire was completed by Peter the Great’s reforms at the beginning of the 1700s. 
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number of religious organizations, led to intense competition for the 
churches, particularly between orthodox communities of different 
jurisdictions. Sometimes such rivalries ran to extremes and escalated 
into violence. Under these circumstances, the decision of the Svato-
Mykhaylivska Parish, approved by the Parishioners’ Assembly in 
1992, to act under the religious guidance of the Archbishop of the 
Finnish Orthodox Church in canonical issues,11
In contrast to the UAOC, which was restored in 1989 on the 
initiative of some believers and clergymen in spite of the authorities’ 
resistance, the UOC KP was established after consultation with and 
approval from the first Ukrainian President. Thus, while the 
Ukrainian government clearly supported one Orthodox Church, 
namely the UOC KP, this came at the cost of the two other 
orthodox churches, the UAOC and the UOC MP. However, the 
position of the local authorities and believers differed from region to 
region and thus weakened the effectiveness of the central 
government attempts “to build [a] unified independent Ukrainian 
Orthodox Church as a spiritual foundation of the independent 
Ukrainian State.”
 does not seem as 
peculiar as it may at first glance. 
A. The Government’s Role in the Church Conflict 
12
After the Presidential election and change of the Ukrainian Head 
of State in 1994, the inclinations of the regime shifted completely to 
support the UOC MP. Since then, the UOC MP has been in good 
order with the new Kuchma administration. Thus, it is no wonder 
that in the course of the conflict within the Svato-Mykhaylivska 
Parish between supporters of different orthodox denominations 
(which happened during the second and more authoritarian term of 
Kuchma’s presidency), all government agencies, including law-
enforcement, tax authorities, and the Ukrainian courts, only 
supported adherents of the Moscow Patriarchate. In a conversation 
with a high-ranking official of the State Committee of the Religious 
Affairs, I was told that it was the standpoint of the Presidential 
 
 
 11. Svato-Mykhaylivska Parafiya v. Ukraine, § 12, application no. 77703/01 (2007), 
available at http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (follow “Case-Law” hyperlink; then follow 
“HUDOC” hyperlink; then search application number “77703/01”). 
 12. This phrase is often ascribed to the first Ukrainian President Mr. Leonid Kravchuk, 
and it indeed conveys the very essence of his ideology of the state-church relations. 
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Administration,13
Having outlined the historical background on which the Svato-
Mykhaylivska Parish’s conflict occurred, I proceed to the subject 
matter of the case. At the time of the division, the Svato-
Mykhaylivska Parish had existed about 10 years. The Parish was 
established in 1989 and was granted legal entity status on 
February 8, 1993.
 and perhaps of President Kuchma personally, that 
all property of the Svato-Mykhaylivska Parish should belong to the 
community that left under the jurisdiction of the Moscow 
Patriarchate. 
III. SVATO-MYKHAYLIVSKA PARAFIYA V. UKRAINE 
14
In March of 1990, when the Parish’s first charter was approved 
by the religious association (then a group of believers with legal 
status similar to an ordinary partnership), and registered by the 
competent authority,
 By the end of the 1990s, the Parish had 
launched construction of its impressive temple complex in Kyiv, 
Ukraine’s capital. In addition, when the division between 
parishioners occurred, the Parish had already erected and owned 
several chapels and other ancillary buildings. 
15
 
 13. Unlike in the United States, the Ukraine Presidential administration does not mean 
government (which is formed by the Parliament and headed by the Prime-minister), but rather 
the Presidential administration helps a Head of State to perform his duties. However, during 
Kuchma’s tenure, particularly in his second term, his Presidential Administration played the 
role of éminence grise in Ukrainian politics and was often more powerful than the Cabinet of 
Ministers. 
 14. The judgment implies that the Parish obtained legal entity status only in February of 
1993, Svato-Mykhaylivska Parafiya, § 14, however, there are reasons to believe that it could 
have happened earlier. Paragraph four of the Resolution of the Ukrainian Parliament “On 
Procedure for Entering into Force of the Act of Ukraine On the Freedom of Conscience and 
Religious Organizations” of April 23, 1991, provided that religious organizations that had 
been registered (naturally without legal entity status) before the Act entered into force had 
until January 1, 1992, to submit their charters to registering authorities. There are no 
explanations in the text of the judgment why the Parish delayed its transformation into a legal 
entity until the beginning of 1993 while it was already possible in 1991. See Svato-Mykhaylivska 
Parafiya, § 14. 
 15. At that time, the registering authority was the Religious Affairs Council at the 
Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. 
 the governing bodies of the Parish were the 
Parishioners’ Assembly, the Parishioners’ Council, and the 
Supervisory Board. Mr. Makarchikov was the chairman of the 
Parishioners’ Council. Later, the Parish changed its legal status and 
charter, but up to the end of 1999, the framework of the Parish’s 
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governmental structure and the leadership of Mr. Makarchikov in the 
Parishioners’ Council remained immutable. 
The Parish’s charter, which was registered by the competent 
authority on February 8, 1993, and had been in force until the end 
of 1999, states: 
2.1. The highest governing body of the Parish is the Parishioners’ 
Assembly, which is eligible in presence of not less than 2/3 of 
members of the Parishioners’ Assembly. Resolutions of the 
Parishioners’ Assembly shall be adopted by a simple majority. 
. . . .  
2.5. All official Parish documents shall be signed by the prior and 
the chair of the Parishioners’ Council; banking and other financial 
documents shall be signed by the chair of the Parishioners’ Council 
and the treasurer. 
. . . . 
2.12. The Parishioners’ Assembly shall accept new members from 
clergymen and laymen at their request, provided they are at least 18 
years of age, attend religious services and confession, follow the 
canonical guidance of the prior and have not been 
excommunicated by the church or are being judged by the 
religious court. 
. . . . 
6.1. Decisions as to changes and amendments to the statute shall 
be proposed by the Parishioners’ Council and adopted by the 
Parishioners’ Assembly.16
From 1994 onward, the ecclesiastic authorities of the UOC MP 
pushed the Parish to amend its original charter in order to bring it in 
line with the model parish charter of the UOC MP. However, the 
Parish refused to do so on several different occasions. In the last 
quarter of 1999, tension between the Parish’s management and the 
UOC MP ecclesiastical authorities escalated. The UOC MP accused 
the Parish’s leaders of bad management of the economic activities of 
the Parish, although the legal basis for such an intervention by the 
ecclesiastical authorities in the Parish business was unclear. At the 
same time, some of the Parish’s laymen accused Mr. Makarchikov 
 
 
 16.  See Svato-Mykhaylivska Parafiya, § 14. 
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and two clergymen of misusing funds that were raised for the 
construction of the church. 
In short, the situation in the fourth quarter of 1999 became 
tense and contentious. On December 24, 1999, at a meeting 
attended by 21 of 27 members, the Parishioners’ Assembly resolved 
to change the Parish’s affiliation and canonical guidance from the 
Moscow Patriarchate to the Kyiv Patriarchate. The leader of the Kyiv 
Patriarchate, Patriarch Filaret, accepted the decision of the Parish 
and admitted it as a religious community acting under his 
jurisdiction. Some days later, authorized representatives of the Parish 
submitted to the Kyiv City State Administration all documents 
necessary to register the amendments to the Parish’s charter aimed at 
legalizing the religious community’s denominational shift. All these 
events occurred during several days at the end of 1999. 
On January 1, 2000, adherents of the Moscow Patriarchate (who 
were the Parish’s members as well as outsiders) gained control over 
all the Parish’s premises. The next day, more than 300 believers 
(whose membership in or relationship with the Parish was at least 
questionable) held a meeting and discharged Mr. Makarchikov, 
elected new governing bodies for the religious community, and 
adopted a new charter in complete conformity with the model parish 
charter of the UOC MP. The fact that no one from the original 
Parish’s Assembly took part in the meeting was merely ignored. 
Thereafter, the original Parish’s Assembly and Parish’s Council, 
led by Mr. Makarchilov and backed by Patriarch Filaret, filed a 
number of complaints and claims before Ukrainian authorities, 
particularly law enforcement bodies such as the police and the 
prosecutor’s office, with requests to defend their property rights. 
Unfortunately, the reaction of law-enforcement was 
counterproductive. For instance, the chief of the district police 
department threatened to initiate a criminal investigation against Mr. 
Makarchikov if he continued to confront the supporters of the 
Moscow Patriarchate. The sister of Mr. Makarchilov even requested 
political asylum in Norway on the grounds of alleged persecution in 
Ukraine linked to her participation in the Parish controversy and 
blood ties with her brother. 
Despite the intervention by several members of the Ukrainian 
Parliament into the case, the active protest of Patriarch Filaret against 
the “seizure of the church” by the Moscow Patriarchate, and despite 
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the case’s publicity,17 the Kyiv City State Administration on 
January 21, 2000, refused to register the amendments approved by 
the original Parish’s Assembly on December 24, 1999. Thereafter, 
the believers that backed Mr. Makarchikov filed the case before the 
Kyiv City Court complaining that the Kyiv City State 
Administration’s refusal to register the Parish charter’s amendments 
of December 24, 1999, was unlawful. On April 21, 2000, the Kyiv 
City Court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims (reasons for this decision 
will be scrutinized later). The plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme 
Court of Ukraine, which upheld the Kyiv Court’s finding. Having 
then exhausted all domestic remedies, the original Parish Assembly 
decided in its meeting on October 6, 2000, to file the case before 
the ECtHR in Strasbourg.18
In Strasbourg, fortune smiled upon the believers led by Mr. 
Makarchikov. At the outset, the ECtHR rejected the Ukrainian 
government’s objections concerning admissibility of the 
application,
 
19 and then the Court found that the Ukrainian 
Government did interfere with the freedom of religion rights of Mr. 
Makarchikov’s religious association.20 Thereafter, the Strasbourg 
Court held that even though such interference was prescribed by 
law,21 such interference did not pursue a legitimate end and was not 
necessary in a democratic society; therefore it was unjustified.22 
While the Court concluded that the refusal to register amendments 
to the Parish’s charter approved by the original Parish’s Assembly 
constituted a violation of Article 9 of the Convention on Human 
Rights, it decided that the applicant’s complaint that Ukraine had 
violated its property rights protected under Article 1 of Protocol 1 to 
the Convention was premature.23
 
 17. See, e.g., Yuriv Doroshenko, Na maydani kolo tserkvi vzhe nikhto nikudi ne yde 
[Nobody go anywhere at the square near the Church], UKRAYINA MOLODA [THE YOUTH OF 
UKRAINE], Jan. 22, 2000. 
 18. Because of the limited scope of this paper, I deliberately omit details of other 
litigation launched by Mr. Makarchikov together with his fellow believers against Svyato-
Mykhaylivska Parish (Moscow Patriarchate) for the return of their personal property. I also 
omit any further details of persecutions that original members of the Parish’s Assembly suffered 
from Ukrainian authorities since those were not the subject matter of the ECtHR proceeding. 
 19. Svato-Mykhaylivska Parafiya v. Ukraine, § 12. 
 20. Id. § 123. 
 21. Id. § 129. 
 22. Id. § 152. 
 23. Id. § 107. 
 Apart from these substantive 
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holdings, the ECtHR in dicta evaluated the Ukrainian legislation 
concerning religious freedom.24
The Ukrainian Act On the Freedom of Conscience and Religious 
Organizations was passed in April of 1991. It was almost a copy of 
the USSR Act with the same name, which was passed in October 
1990. First and foremost, the Ukrainian Act granted religious 
organizations the status of a legal entity, which stood as a significant 
shift from Soviet times when religious groups existed as pseudo-
partnerships with very limited legal capacities.
 
IV. THE ECTHR’S JUDGMENT IN LIGHT OF UKRAINIAN 
LEGISLATION 
The last mentioned fact leads us to further analysis of the 
judgment in light of and in comparison with the domestic law, of 
which the core piece is the Act of Ukraine On the Freedom of 
Conscience and Religious Organizations. Before this comparison is 
made, however, an introduction to this Act is necessary. 
A. The Ukrainian Act on the Freedom of Conscience and Religious 
Organizations 
25
Apart from providing for the legal status of religious 
organizations, the Act reiterated most provisions of the international 
(mainly UN) instruments of human rights, and particularly the 
freedom of religion. From this viewpoint, the Ukrainian Act was in 
the 1990s (and maybe now) one of the most adjusted to 
international standards in this field. However, its main weakness was, 
and is, its declarative nature: the Act’s concrete implementing 
provisions do not provide for an effective mechanism to ensure its 
wonderful declarations are realized.
 
26
 
 24. Id. § 152; see also id. §§ 130, 145. 
 25. It may sound quite surprising, but the right to religious freedom as a constitutional 
principle was declared in all constitutions of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) as 
well as the Ukrainian SSR constitutions. 
 26. It should be borne in mind that Ukraine belongs to the family of civil law countries; 
therefore, it is virtually impossible to develop declarative provisions by judge-made law like has 
happened with the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 
 
For instance, Chapter 1 of the Act echoes Article 9 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, announcing in broad 
declarative fashion: 
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Everyone enjoys the right to freedom of conscience. This right 
includes freedom to voluntary adhere, embrace and change one’s 
religion or beliefs and freedom, either alone or in community with 
others to profess whichever religion or do not profess anyone, 
worship, manifest in public and freely disseminate one’s religious or 
atheistic beliefs.  
. . . .  
Exercise of the freedom to manifest a religion or beliefs shall be 
subject only to such limitations as are necessary for securing public 
safety and public order, life, health and morality as well as rights 
and freedoms of others citizens which are prescribed by law and 
comply with international commitments of Ukraine.27
Notwithstanding the opening chapter’s broad assertion of a 
universal freedom of religion, the specific provisions of the Act seem 
counterproductive to this rather lofty goal. For example, the Act 
includes an exhaustive list of forms in which religious organizations 
could be established.
 
28
 
 27. Act of Ukraine, On the Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations, art. 3 
(Apr. 23, 1991). 
 28. Id. at art. 7. 
 This list is very limited, based on religious 
(and not on legal) classification, and does not embrace even such 
traditional religious entities as monastic orders or hermitages. There 
is no justification or explanation in the Act or other official 
documents as to why legislators limited the forms in which religious 
organizations could be established—although such limitation 
obviously constitutes restriction on religious freedom. 
This is just one example of discrepancy between the Act’s 
declarations and regulatory provisions exercised by administrative 
bodies in everyday practice. According to the Council of Europe, the 
main drawbacks of the Act, excluding the one just mentioned, are: 
1) it requires ten adults to have the statute [i.e. charter] of a 
religious organization registered, whereas the same requirement 
for other civic associations is only three adults; 
2) it prohibits the creation of local or regional divisions without 
legal entity status, such as branches and subsidiaries; 
3) it lacks the possibility for granting legal entity status to religious 
associations [i.e. unions], such as the Catholic or Orthodox 
Churches, etc.; 
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4) it discriminates against foreigners and stateless persons; 
5) it lacks clarity with regard to which organizations are required to 
register with regional state administrations and which with the 
State Committee on Religious Affairs; 
6) the Law [i.e. the Act] also contains a number of other 
ambiguous provisions, which leave a wide discretion to the 
implementing authorities.29
As was pointed out above, the Act On the Freedom of Conscience 
and Religious Organizations was approved on the eve of Ukrainian 
independence. Regrettably, during the following years when Ukraine 
approved fundamental legal acts like the Constitution (1996) and 
the Civil Code (2003), the Act was never amended significantly. 
Consequently, I fully subscribe to the conclusion of Mrs. Severinsen 
and Mrs. Wohlwend, the former Monitoring Committee co-
reporters of the PACE, who suggested that “the quite progressive 
law [i.e. the Act] for the time of its adoption now requires significant 
rewording.”
 
30
When the Svato-Mykhaylivska Parish was set up in April 1989, it 
immediately began various activities, including collecting the 
necessary documents and permissions to launch construction of a 
temple complex, even though it was not yet recognized as a legal 
 
B. The Svato-Mykaylivska Parish’s Legal Status Under the Ukrainian 
Act of 1991 
Having provided the critical outline of the Ukrainian Act 
designed to ensure religious freedom and regulate the relationship 
between the government and religious organizations, and before 
returning to the ECtHR’s judgment, I must address the legal status 
of the Parish, its corporate governance, and its interrelation with 
other Churches, i.e. religious unions with which the Parish is 
affiliated. 
 
 29. Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by Ukraine, EUR. PARL. DOC. 10676, 
§ 269 (2005), available at http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/WorkingDocs/doc05/ 
EDOC10676.htm. The judgment, Svato-Mykhaylivska Parafiya, quotes this document at § 87. 
 30. Id. 
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entity. Probably until February 1993,31
From the moment the Parish shifted the form of business 
ownership and obtained the status of a legal entity, it “belonged to 
the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate).”
 the Parish acted in the 
capacity of some kind of partnership and not as a corporate body. 
32 
However, the term “belong” here is not precise enough from a legal 
point of view. As was mentioned above, the Act does not permit 
legal entity status for religious unions that include not just persons, 
but also other religious organizations. Thus, centralized churches 
like the Orthodox Church or the Catholic Church cannot receive 
legal entity status in Ukraine. Instead, the Act provides that 
“[r]eligious unions are represented by their centers 
(administrations).”33
Thus, from a legal point of view, it is impossible for the Parish as 
a legal entity to “belong” to a religious union (like the Ukrainian 
Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchate) which does not enjoy 
any legal status. Because of this, relations between the Parish and the 
Church also are barred from being adjusted by agreement or 
contract. The sole document which governs participation of the 
Church authorities in the Parish management is the Parish Charter. 
According to the Act, a charter should contain information 
indicating what type of religion the organization follows and “place 
of the religious organization in the institutional framework of the 
religious union.”
 However, a center or an administration of the 
type mentioned in the Act is no more than a management body of a 
religious union and as such could not comprise, much less “possess,” 
any other organizations. 
34
Moreover, the Act provides: “The State takes into account 
traditions and internal guidelines of religious organizations and 
respects them as long as they conform to the law”
 No legislative provision requires specification in a 
charter of the role that ecclesiastical authorities are to play in the 
management of the organization’s activities. 
35
 
 31. See Svato-Mykhaylivska Parafiya v. Ukraine, §§ 13–14, application no. 77703/01 
(2007), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (follow “Case-Law” hyperlink; then 
follow “HUDOC” hyperlink; then search application number “77703/01”). 
 32. See id. § 14. 
 33. Act of Ukraine, On the Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations, art. 
7(2) (Apr. 23, 1991).  
 34. Id. at art. 12(1)–(2). 
 35. Id. at art. 5(3). 
 and adds that 
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“[r]eligious organizations in Ukraine . . . act according to their 
hierarchic and institutional structure, elect, appoint and rotate their 
staff in accordance with their charters (regulations).”36 It further 
provides: “A religious organization as a legal entity exercises rights 
and obligations determined by the legislation in force and its own 
charter.”37
The State recognizes the right of a religious community
 As for religious communities, the legislation states: 
38 to 
subordinate itself in canonical or organizational matters to any 
religious centre (administration) residing within or outside 
Ukraine, as well as free change of such a subordination.39
It could be concluded from the quoted provisions that the 
Ukrainian legislation deems religious organizations, particularly 
those like a religious community founded directly by believers and 
not by another legal entity, as autonomous, self-governing units with 
wide discretion. In accordance with legal logic, authorities of a 
religious union should enjoy as much authority in the community’s 
business as the community has granted them. Under such legal 
conditions, ecclesiastical authorities are capable of curbing the 
community’s powers and increasing their own power in the 
community’s business only by the addition of the appropriate 
provisions into the community charter. That explains why in the 
analyzed case the ecclesiastical authority (Kyivan Metropolitan of the 
UOC MP) again and again demanded that the Parish approve a 
standard charter which would grant to the former a “golden share” 
in the Parish. Perhaps the same consideration induced the 
Parishioners’ Assembly to resist such demands.
 
40
Accordingly, it was the Parish’s charter which regulated not only 
the corporate governance of the religious community but also the 
sensitive issue of denomination affiliation and its subsequent shift. 
The Kyivan Metropolitan (the “religious centre” of the Ukrainian 
 
 
 36. Id. at art. 7(1). 
 37. Id. at art. 13(2). 
 38. In the text of the judgment, the Ukrainian term “religiyna hromada” was translated 
as a “religious group,” while it should be translated as a “religious community” to convey its 
meaning precisely. See Svato-Mykhaylivska Parafiya v. Ukraine, application no. 77703/01 
(2007). 
 39. Act of Ukraine, On the Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations, art. 
8(2) (Apr. 23, 1991) (emphasis added). The translation of this provision given in the 
judgment is quite loose. See Svato-Mykhaylivska Parafiya, § 83. 
 40. See Svato-Mykhaylivska Parafiya, §§ 15, 17. 
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Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchate) failed to persuade the 
Parish to amend its charter even though it was clear that ecclesiastical 
authority could put the Parish under an interdict or other canonical 
punishment. The Metropolitan was unable to legally prevent the 
Parish from changing its affiliation because the latter did so by virtue 
of the appropriate provisions of its charter. Therefore, the core 
question for those Ukrainian authorities, including the relevant 
judicial bodies that dealt with the Parish’s dispute, should have been 
whether the original Parishioners’ Assembly acted intra vires in 
deciding to change the jurisdiction and canonical guidance of the 
Parish.41
From this point of view, the principal finding of the ECtHR may 
be reduced to one observation: instead of scrutinizing whether the 
body (or rather bodies) of the divided Parish acted in line with the 
Parish’s charter and in such a way maintained respect for the 
autonomy of the religious community, Ukrainian authorities 
unjustifiably interfered into the field of religious freedom and 
freedom of association.
 Unfortunately, this was not the approach taken by those 
authorities. 
42
I begin my criticism of the ECtHR’s judgment by pointing out 
some minor factual mistakes in its text. The judgment states: “On 22 
March 1992 the Parishioners’ Assembly passed resolutions for the 
religious association to change denomination, as it was dissatisfied 
with the leadership of Archbishop Filaret, the head of the newly 
registered Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Kyiv Patriarchate . . . .”
 However, even with such a welcome 
outcome, the judgment of the Strasbourg bench is not above 
criticism. 
C. The ECtHR’s Missed Opportunity 
43
 
 41. See id. § 23. 
 42. Id. § 152. 
 43. Id. § 12 (emphasis added). 
 
In March 1992, Metropolitan (the correct title that, in the Orthodox 
hierarchy, is higher than Archbishop) Filaret was the head of the 
Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchate. The formal 
meeting of bishops (Archbishop Council) of the Russian Orthodox 
Church that forced him to resign office took place from March 31 to 
April 4, 1992, and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Kyiv 
Patriarchate was set up about two months later on June 25, 1992. 
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Therefore, it is not possible that Metropolitan Filaret headed the 
Kyiv Patriarchate in March 1992, because the latter did not then 
exist. However, this factual error certainly is not vital as it by no 
means affected the outcome of the Court’s judgment. 
The ECtHR continued its judgment by aptly criticizing the legal 
framework in which religious organizations provided their activity in 
Ukraine.44
[T]here is a clear inconsistency in the domestic law as to what 
constitutes a “religious organisation” and what constitutes a 
“religious group”, or whether they have the same meaning, the 
only difference between the two being the local status of a 
“religious group” and the lack of any requirement for its official 
registration under the Act.
 Nevertheless, it seems that in attacking Ukrainian 
legislation, the Strasbourg Court fell into the snare of loose 
translation, stating: 
45
In fact, the Act referenced by the Court sufficiently and clearly 
distinguishes these two concepts. “Religious organisation” is a 
generic term which covers all religious establishments, while the term 
“religious group” (or rather “community” or “parish,” language 
which more correctly conveys the meaning of the Ukrainian word 
“hromada”) is specific for a type of religious organization formed 
directly by believers.
 
46
But the ECtHR’s later fallacy was not so innocuous. Despite the 
existence of a number of inconsistencies and ambiguities in the 
Ukrainian Act On the Freedom of Conscience and Religious 
Organizations, the Act does contain a set of sufficiently clear 
provisions that call for safeguarding the autonomy of religious 
communities against arbitrary state interference. In particular, the 
Act guarantees religious communities the freedom to subordinate 
themselves to religious centers and to change such affiliations 
 Nevertheless, this misstatement was not 
essential to the Court’s finding. Aside from this terminological 
misunderstanding and the Court’s silence regarding the impossibility 
that religious unions could be granted legal entity status, the 
Strasbourg Court’s criticism of Ukrainian legislation was well-
grounded and entirely correct. 
 
 44. See id. §§ 130, 145, 152. 
 45. See id. § 145. 
 46. Act of Ukraine, On the Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organisation, art. 
7(2) (Apr. 23, 1991). 
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freely.47 It also declares respect for traditions and internal guidelines 
of religious organizations.48 Further, it clearly provides that 
“religious organizations in Ukraine . . . act according to their 
hierarchic and institutional structure, elect, appoint and rotate their 
staff in accordance with their charters (regulations).”49
The ECtHR asserted that the Ukrainian authorities’ refusal to 
register the amendments to the Parish statute, an action later upheld 
by Ukrainian courts, was caused principally “by the lack of coherence 
and foreseeability” of the legislation.
 
50 This conclusion is doubtful. 
My Ukrainian experience, along with my examination of Ukrainian 
legislation and information I obtained from state officials,51
As was previously mentioned, the Ukrainian authorities that dealt 
with the Parish’s case faced a fundamental choice: to base their 
decisions on the charter as the Parish’s internal constitution 
(inasmuch as its provisions do not directly contravene the law) or to 
judge the case by other reasons, only taking the Parish’s charter into 
account inter alia as one, but not the core, benchmark against which 
the dispute could be measured. Unfortunately, Ukrainian authorities 
refused the first way, which presupposed that the clash between 
 convince 
me that the apt English words for the Ukrainian authorities’ actions 
in this case are “arbitrariness” and “bias.” However, it should be 
kept in mind that the European Court of Human Rights must be 
much more politically correct when it criticizes a foreign country 
than do scholars when they judge their own countrymen. 
One last remark should be made in this section. From my point 
of view, the Strasbourg Court did not focus enough on the fact that 
believers who decided to change their denomination would have 
faced no problem implementing such action. Nobody prevented or 
hindered the adherents from transferring themselves to another 
church and registering a new religious community. Rather, the 
crucial issue was which part of the divided religious community 
enjoyed the legal right to make such a decision on behalf of the 
Parish as a legal entity, especially considering that such a decision 
would concern canonical and organizational subordination to 
ecclesiastical authorities and the change of such subordination. 
 
 47. Id. at art. 8(2). 
 48. Id. at art. 5(3). 
 49. Id. at art. 7(1). 
 50. See Svato-Mykhaylivska Parafiya, § 152. 
 51. See supra text accompanying note 13. 
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believers would be judged as a purely corporate dispute.52 Had the 
Ukrainian authorities chosen to do so, it would have been a clear and 
easy case. Most likely, the original Parish’s Assembly would have 
removed the formal obstacle for the registration of the charter’s 
amendments, namely the lack of the former’s signature on the 
amendments of December 24, 1999,53
In contrast, Ukrainian authorities, particularly those courts that 
dealt with the Parish’s case, employed an alternative strategy. 
Consequently, the domestic courts’ reasoning seems vague and 
inconsistent. For example, the Kyiv City Court treated the Parish like 
a Church subsidiary that was established or owned by the 
ecclesiastical authority, not as an autonomous association of believers 
that was free to determine its religious affiliation.
 and the argument would 
have been resolved. 
54 Moreover, the 
Supreme Court of Ukraine judged the case not from within the 
scope of the Parish’s charter, but rather scrutinized the charter 
against current Ukrainian legislation.55
 
 52. Cf. Syato-Mykhayliyska Parafiya, § 139. 
 53. Cf. id. § 42. 
 54. Id. § 51 (outlining the Ukraine Supreme Court’s reasoning). 
 55. Id. § 52. 
 The Supreme Court found 
that the charter contravened the law, particularly the fixed 
membership in the religious community prescribed by it. These 
findings were inconclusive and constitute a shining example of the 
“totalitarian” perception of the law: all is prohibited except what is 
clearly permitted. This approach is obviously incompatible with basic 
democratic principles. 
Thus, we see that the questions posed by the case at hand were 
twofold. On the one hand, the Parish’s dispute led to unjustified 
intrusion by state authorities into the Parish’s autonomous 
arrangements, and the ECtHR ascertained such impropriety. On the 
other hand, the clash between rival groups of the divided religious 
community was in and of itself a purely corporate conflict that could 
and should have been resolved on the basis of, and in accordance 
with, the Parish’s corporate charter. The ECtHR failed to highlight 
this fact properly. Consequently, the domestic follow-up of the 
Strasbourg judgment upholds such a view. 
DO NOT DELETE 9/18/2009  4:45 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2009 
572 
V. FOLLOW-UP AND CONCLUSION 
The follow-up to the seemingly endless Svato-Mykhaylivska 
Parish narrative occurred about a year after the ECtHR’s judgment 
was delivered in Strasbourg. Ukrainian legislation includes a special 
act entitled On the Enforcement of Judgments and Application of 
Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights.56 Even though 
Article 2 thereof declares that “[j]udgments [of the ECtHR] are 
obligatory for execution by Ukraine,”57 Chapter III of the Act, 
which elaborates the methods of and procedures for such an 
execution, explains that, excluding pecuniary compensation, a court 
victory in Strasbourg simply means that the case decided by the 
ECtHR is subject to revision.58
In remanding the case to the Kyiv District Administrative 
Court,
 
Therefore, having won the case in Strasbourg, the Parish (or 
rather the group of believers that wanted to change the affiliation of 
the Parish and have been struggling to do so since the end of 1999) 
simply opened the door to further domestic litigation. The original 
plaintiff lodged a complaint about reopening the case, renewing its 
original claim. The Supreme Court of Ukraine (which was the 
domestic court of last resort that dealt with the case before it was 
lodged with the Strasbourg court) granted the Parish’s complaint 
only in part. It held that the case should be reopened, but refused to 
deliver final judgment by itself, ordering a new hearing in the Kyiv 
District Administrative Court. 
59 the Supreme Court asserted that the Code of 
Administrative Justice of Ukraine provides that if an international 
judicial body, the jurisdiction of which is recognized by Ukraine, 
holds that a judgment or decision delivered by a Ukrainian court 
violates an international obligation of Ukraine, such judgment or 
decision should be reopened and reviewed.60
 
 56. Act of Ukraine, On the Enforcement of the Judgments and Application of the Case-
Law of the European Court of Human Rights, art. 13(1) (Feb. 23, 2006), available at 
http://sutyajnik.ru/rus/echr/etc/2006_law_ukraine.htm#_ftnref1. 
 57. Id. at art. 2(1). This quote was translated by the author from its original Ukrainian. 
 58. Id. at art. 10(1), (3). 
 59. Since the original action was brought before the court by Mr. Makarchikov in 2000, 
the design of the Ukrainian judicial system has been changed. An administrative justice system 
has been established, and therefore the case which fell within the jurisdiction of general courts 
in 2000 fell under the jurisdiction of administrative courts in 2007. 
 60. CODE OF ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE OF UKRAINE art. 237(2). 
 Under Ukrainian law, 
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reviewing the grounds of such a case is classified as an “exceptional 
circumstance.” The Supreme Court noted that the judgment of the 
ECtHR in Svato-Mykhaylivska Parish v. Ukraine determined that the 
outcome of the national litigation violated Article 9 of the 
Convention, interpreted in the light of articles 6(1) and 11 thereof. 
As obiter dictum, the Ukrainian highest bench reiterated the view of 
the ECtHR that the national judiciary had failed to repair the 
violation of religious freedom made by administrative authorities 
because of what the Court saw as a contradiction in Ukrainian 
legislation and lack of foreseeability. 
The Supreme Court of Ukraine also reworded ECtHR’s core 
statement, asserting that the state enjoys a narrow scope of discretion 
concerning restrictions of religious freedom. The highest bench 
concluded that such restrictions should be defined and applied 
strictly in line with the Convention and ECtHR’s interpretation 
thereof. On that basis, and by virtue of Article 13 of the Act On the 
Enforcement of Judgments and Application of Case-Law of the 
European Court of Human Rights, the Supreme Court held that it is 
against the law to restrict the right to freedom of religion by 
ungrounded refusal to register amendments to a charter by religious 
groups aimed at changing their confessional association if such 
restriction is not necessary in a democratic society. 
The Ukrainian Supreme Court reached the conclusion that in 
dealing with the Svato-Mykhaylivska Parish case, the national 
judiciary had not taken into account provisions of the European 
Convention on Human Rights and its interpretation in ECtHR case 
law. This is what led to the substantial fault in the domestic litigation 
outcome. Therefore, the highest Ukrainian judicial body revoked the 
decision and judgment of the Kyiv Court (which was confirmed by 
the Supreme Court’s own decision) and expedited the case to the 
Kyiv District Administrative Court for a new trial which should take 
into consideration the provisions of the European Convention on 
Human Rights and its interpretation in the ECtHR case law. 
But the substance of the dispute has not been resolved so far, 
and the longer it continues, the more complicated it becomes. This 
is because the partly new religious community formed at the 
beginning of 2000, and bound up with the Moscow Patriarchate, 
has been running the Parish’s business for more than eight years and 
has contributed significantly to the temple complex development. 
Therefore, deciding how to divide the Parish’s property between the 
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two religious communities will be very complicated, especially if the 
injustices suffered by Kyiv Patriarchate’s adherents, led by 
Mr. Makarchikov, are to be redressed. Thus, the easy and fair 
solution of the dispute, based on observance of the Parish’s charter 
which seemed apt in 2000, is now out of date. 
What conclusions has Ukraine drawn from this case, which 
constitutes the first time the state lost in litigation with a religious 
organization before the Strasbourg Court? Unfortunately, and in 
spite of the clear prescription of the national law that obligated 
national authorities “to take an action aimed to correct the system’s 
shortcomings,”61 the Ukrainian government has done nothing. No 
discussion with regard to the ECtHR’s judgment has been initiated, 
nor have necessary amendments to the current legislation been 
drafted. Even the temple complex of Svato-Mykhaylivska Parish up 
to now has remained under the control of the Moscow Patriarchate. 
Fulfillment of the governing coalition’s pledge “to redraft the Act 
On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organization”62
 
 61. See Act of Ukraine, On the Enforcement of the Judgments and Application of the 
Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights, art. 13(2) (Feb. 23, 2006). 
 62. See the Agreement Establishing the Coalition of the Democratic Forces in the 6th 
Verkhovna Rada (the Parliament of Ukraine) of Nov. 29, 2007, art. 1.4, which was officially 
published in HOLOS UKRAYINI [UKRAINIAN VOICE], an official Ukrainian Parliament’s 
gazette, No. 223–224, Dec. 12, 2007. 
 that was 
given some months after the judgment became final has most likely 
been left for better days. 
I, however, remain optimistic. Notwithstanding the 
aforementioned facts, the judgment has not passed unnoticed. I 
hope this case, which lies on the junction of religious freedom 
jurisprudence—with fundamental principles of constitutional and 
international law on the one hand, and corporate law and 
governance on the other—contributes not only to scholarly 
discussion and academic reflection, but also to the development of 
law and an improvement in national legislation. The main message of 
the judgment is that a religious community, just as any other 
corporation in private law, enjoys the right to determine its own 
structure and its association with ecclesiastical authorities, including 
the right to change its canonical and organizational subordination to 
or affiliation with the latter. There is no doubt, at least within 
Europe, that this message has been heard and has already become an 
important standard for human rights. 
